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The role of twentieth-century agricultural mechanization in changing the productivity, employment
opportunities, and appearance of rural America has long been appreciated.  Less attention has been
paid to the impact made by farm tractors, combines, and associated equipment on the standard of living
of the U.S. population as a whole.  This paper demonstrates, through use of a detailed counterfactual
analysis, that mechanization in the production of farm products increased GDP by more than 8.0 percent,
using 1954 as a base year.  This result suggests that studying individual innovations can significantly
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     The mechanization of agriculture in the twentieth century, propelled by the development and 
universal adoption of the gasoline or diesel tractor, has significantly and permanently changed 
the economic and physical landscape of the United States.  The number of people working on 
farms has dropped from a peak of 13 million in 1910 to about 6 million today, during which time 
the country’s population has more than tripled, from 92 million to almost 310 million.  Horses 
and mules, the dominant source of farm power at the turn of the century, have all but disappeared 
from the scene.  The average size of a farm has more than tripled, driven by economies of scale.  
Numerous small towns, their economic viability weakened by decreases in population density in 
the surrounding areas, have almost ceased to exist. 
     From the standpoint of the overall U.S. economy and the consuming public, however, the 
benefits have been substantial.  The efficiency of tractors in performing farm tasks has 
dramatically reduced the inputs required in producing the food we eat.  The long secular decline 
in relative food prices has allowed increased consumption of other goods, even among the 
poorest in our society.  Labor released from agriculture has long since been absorbed into 
manufacturing and services, fuelling growth in these areas.  Agricultural surpluses, stimulated by 
mechanization and yield improvements from the green revolution in farming, have helped feed 
people throughout the world. 
     This paper quantifies some of these benefits from mechanization, through the use of a 
counterfactual analysis.  Using the year 1954 as a base, we estimate a direct social savings of 
$29.2 billion, equivalent to 8.0 percent of GNP, when compared to a hypothetical economy at the 
same date using farm power technology available in 1910.  Although this contribution is a small 
part of the doubling of real per-capita GNP between these two dates, it nonetheless is large 
enough to be considered a significant growth factor.  This analysis calls into questionan  
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assumption often cited by growtheconomists:  that individual technological improvements are 
too minor to be studied in isolation.   
BACKGROUND 
     In his influential work on United States railroads, Robert Fogel used the emerging techniques 
of the New Economic History to attack a popular belief among historians that railroads were 
indispensable to American economic growth.
1  His counterfactual analysis of commodity 
transportation yielded a social savings estimate which suggested that railroads made only a small 
contribution to national income in the year 1890 (about 1.0 per cent if adaptations were 
permitted).  Fogel used his results to support Simon Kuznets’ assertion that no single innovation 
was important enough to be worthy of study in isolation.  Technological progress, although a key 
factor in promoting economic growth, was, in his view, made up of a large number of individual 
improvements, none large enough by itself to be significant. 
     Professor Fogel defended his data and analysis against a number of critics many years ago, 
and his critique of the ‘hero theory’ has been largely accepted.  The belief that technological 
change consists of countless small innovations has become embedded in much of current growth 
theory in economics.  Many of the currently popular macroeconomic models use a technology-
improvement parameter that grows exponentially over time, without any exogenous stimulus 
other than random shocks.  Even more recent work in endogenous growth theory still models 
new technologies as ‘arriving’ at a steady rate, rather than being created and developed.   
     We contend that this emphasis seriously undervalues the contribution of the inventors, 
entrepreneurs, and firms that were and are the drivers of much technological change.  The work 
of Nathan Rosenberg and Joel Mokyr, among others, convincingly portrays invention and 
innovation as critical to growth of income and wealth over the long term.
2  A large literature has  
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emerged over the past 30 years attempting to relate research & development to growth, almost 
exclusively by econometrically relating R&D spending with total factor productivity increases.  
This work consistently shows strong correlation between the two factors, but convincing 
evidence demonstrating causation is lacking. 
 
PREVIOUS WORK 
     There have been relatively few attempts to quantify the direct economic impacts of new 
technology, however.  Zvi Griliches’ early work on hybrid corn and Schmitz and Seckler’s 
research on the mechanical tomato harvester are two of these related to agriculture.
3  Spurred on 
by the early work of Fogel and Albert Fishlow, scholars have investigated the impact of railroads 
on growth in a number of different countries, often finding direct social savings far greater than 
that measured by Fogel.
4  Especially notable are the work of John Coatsworth and William 
Summerhill, who quantified social benefits in excess of 10 percent for Mexico and Brazil, 
respectively.
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     Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode have explored some of the economic benefits from adoption 
of the tractor, work which has arisen out of their interest in diffusion of agricultural 
technologies.
6   Olmstead and Rhode acknowledge that economic historians have largely ignored 
the impact of mechanization on society, and set about to remedy the situation.  They choose to 
model tractor adoption as a capital replacement problem, with benefits arising from lower input 
costs, and include land augmentation as well. 
     Citing estimates of labor, machine, and other inputs from a number of USDA farm studies 
from the 1930s and 1940s, Olmstead and Rhode derive an estimate of labor savings from 
mechanization equal to 1.7 billion effort-hours per year by 1944.  Because their estimates include  
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primarily field efficiency improvements, the authors find savings of 850,000 workers, or about 
8% of total agricultural requirements.  In the present work, a detailed counterfactual model and 
more comprehensive approach yields substantially higher social savings estimates.  
         Although improvements in transportation, industrialization in general, R&D spending, and 
investments in education and other human capital are widely recognized as supporting economic 
growth, agriculture has been considered a laggard or even a hindrance.  Upon finding that 
agricultural productivity measured in value terms was lower than that of manufacturing, and had 
increased at a slower rate over the past half-century, Denison and other pioneers of growth 
accounting proposed that rapid transfer of resources out of agriculture was a necessary condition 
for countries to grow.
7  An entire generation of development economists encouraged third-world 
countries to abandon agriculture and focus their energies on manufacturing or other inherently 
‘high-growth’ activities. 
     This advice was based on two misconceptions about the United States’ agricultural history.  
First, although productivity in farming was growing relatively slowly in the units measured, 
dollars of output per dollars of input, advances in physical terms (bushels per labor hour, for 
instance) were quite rapid.  Due to quite low income and price demand elasticities, large 
increases in physical output had the primary effect of driving down output prices; thus, success 
in increasing productivity had the paradoxical effects of reducing agriculture’s share in national 
output and total factor income and produced total factor productivity numbers that appeared 
unimpressive. 
     Second, the period during which the growth accountants were gathering their data was one of 
massive adjustment of resources out of agriculture.  The mechanization described in this paper 
led to the movement of more than eight million workers from farms to other employment,  
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creating a large and long-lasting disequilibrium.  In finding that wages in agriculture were well 
below that in other sectors, even after controlling for education and other differences, Theodore 
Schultz (among others) concluded that the labor market had failed to adjust optimally; growth in 
the United States could be speeded up by accelerating the move out of agriculture.
8  It is 
important to understand the true implications of this finding.  Labor and other resources devoted 
to agriculture were not inherently less productive; they had become so due to massive 
technological change and a failure to adjust quickly enough.  This point will be revisited in the 
conclusion to the paper, after enumeration of the social savings.   
HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY 
Agriculture in 1910 
     The decade between 1910 and 1920 marked the peak of animal-powered farming in the 
United States.
9  With the frontier closed and population expanding through rapid immigration,  
farmers employed more than 21 million horses and 5 million mules to produce the nation’s 
crops.  Of the total land area in the continental United States in 1910, farmland comprised almost 
half, representing 879 million acres.  Slightly more than a third of this, or 310 million acres, were 
used for growing crops, the remainder being woodland, pasture, land for structures, and 
unimproved areas.  Agricultural output was sufficient to provide an exportable surplus of cotton, 
tobacco, grains, and animal products totaling $900 million, slightly exceeding farm product 
imports.
10 
     A summary of the leading crops is shown here as Table 1.
11  Corn was the most important 
agricultural commodity, both in terms of acreage planted and value.  Then, as today, about four-
fifths of the corn raised was fed to animals, including draft animals such as horses and mules, as 
well as hogs, cattle, chickens, and other food animals.  Hay, was likewise fed to both types of  
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animals, but not of course to people.  Oats, the fifth most valuable crop, was also fed mostly to 
animals and made up a significant proportion of horse and mule feed.  Wheat was grown almost 
exclusively for human consumption and made up the third largest crop by acreage.  Cotton, 
although not grown as widely as wheat or oats, was a more valuable crop and a major source of 
export revenue:  more than 70 percent of the 10.6 million bales grown in 1909 were exported. 
     Nearly all of these crops were grown, cultivated, and harvested using animal power or manual 
labor.  Although steam-powered traction engines had been in use for plowing since the 1870s 
and gasoline tractors had been commercially available for a few years, neither had made a major 
impact on farming.  Their massive size and weight made them usable only for threshing grain 
and plowing, and even then only in areas with hard, dry ground.  Before 1910, only about 58,000 
steam traction engines and 2,500 gas tractors had ever been produced, and U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) estimates showed only about 1,000 gasoline machines in use in 1910.
12  As 
such, we consider 1910 to be essentially pre-tractor and are using its input-output structure as 
the basis for the counterfactual 1954 economy considered later. 
     The 1910 census places the value of horses and mules on farms at $2.6 billion, or about 
6 percent of all farm property.  With implements and machinery valued at $1.27 billion, U.S. 
farms had almost $3.9 billion in ‘crop-growing’ capital.  Capital intensity can be calculated at 
$12.52 per acre, a number that remained constant in real terms through the first half of the 
century.  This surprising finding will be considered in the counterfactual analysis later in the 
paper. 
     In 1910, more than 32 million people lived on the nation’s farms, comprising 35 percent of 
the total population.  Of these, the census records 12.1 million as farm workers, or about one-
third of the total work force of 38 million.  Some pertinent statistics on agricultural employment  
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are shown here in Table 2.  In a separate estimate, the UDSA calculated that a total of 22.55 
billion hours of labor were expended in farming in 1910
13; this ties in reasonably well with the 
census work force number, indicating an average of about 1,860 hours per worker per year. 
Development of the tractor and related technologies 
     This section presents an abbreviated developmental history of the tractor and other closely 
related machines.
14  The idea for gasoline-powered traction engines emerged shortly after the 
introduction of the internal combustion engine in the 1880s.  The first working model was 
introduced in 1892, and commercial models were sold beginning in 1902.  The first tractors 
shared similar traits to the steam traction engines that had emerged 20–30 years earlier.  
Weighing between 20,000 and 30,000 pounds, with huge steel wheels or tracks, these models 
were large and expensive. 
     Driven by intense competition, the major manufacturers worked to reduce both size and cost, 
and by the time Ford introduced its Fordson model (the first successful small tractor) in 1917, 
average weights were down to 2,000–6,000 pounds, and prices were under $1,000.  International 
Harvester led the next round of innovation, introducing a general purpose (GP) tractor, the 
Farmall, in 1925.  This model, with high ground clearance, small front wheels, and modest 
weight, was designed for cultivating, as well as for plowing and cutting.  By the mid-1930s, GPs 
had replaced the standard Fordson-type tractor in most applications. 
     Three other improvements were critical in completing the technology base for the tractor.  
Deere released a power lift for its models beginning in 1927.  This device allowed the implement 
to be raised before every turn by pulling a lever.  Rubber tires first became available for tractors 
in 1932, and by 1938 had largely replaced steel wheels.  The pneumatic tires not only did less 
damage to fields, they allowed a higher forward speed, due to reduced friction.  Finally, the  
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development of diesel engines beginning in the mid-1930s gave farmers access to a lower-cost 
fuel for their machines, eventually replacing kerosene and gasoline engines for most tractors. 
     By about 1934, the technology of tractor development had achieved a ‘dominant design’.  The 
Farmall-type general purpose tractors would change little over the next 30 years.  Beginning in 
1935, and despite the ongoing depression in the United States, tractor sales increased rapidly.  As 
is shown by the trends in farm use of tractors and draft animals in Figure 1, the process of 
diffusion was essentially complete by 1960.  With the exception of the cotton South, the increase 
in the percent of farms with tractors from year to year had stopped. 
     Self-propelled implements, which integrated a tractor engine and operator’s compartment 
within the implement itself, were the next logical development in the mechanization of 
agriculture.  Combine harvesters, or ‘combines’ for short, were first released during World War 
II and were soon universally adopted in dry grain growing areas; a team of combines harvesting 
a huge field of wheat is one of the most recognizable images in modern U.S. agriculture.  Later 
introduction of self-propelled corn and cotton pickers allowed complete mechanization of these 
technically more-complicated tasks during the 1950s and 1960s.  As all of these devices are 
critically dependent for their operation on internal combustion engines, self-propelled combines 
and mechanical pickers as considered here as products of ‘tractorization’. 
Agriculture in 1954 
     By the mid-1950s, U.S. agriculture had changed dramatically from half a century earlier and 
was approaching full mechanization.
15  Recent developments in the genetic selection of seed 
characteristics and increased use of chemical fertilizers had launched the second major 
productivity revolution of the twentieth century, that of dramatic yield improvement.  Several 
important new crops had emerged and were being widely cultivated, most notably soybeans and  
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sorghum.  Two wars, the Great Depression, and several sharp agricultural slumps had alternately 
boosted and ravaged farm income.  The population of the United States had increased by 
80 percent to 165 million, while farms had lost more than 40 percent of their people.
16 
     Despite these changes, the amount of land used to grow field crops was little altered.  The 
total reported for the census year of 1954 was 329 million acres, a 6 percent increase from 1909, 
and only 30 million less than the all-time high reached in 1929.  Large decreases in corn and 
cotton acreage were balanced by the 18 million acres of soybeans and 16 million acres of grain 
sorghum added to the nation’s output mix.  Exports of farm products totaled $3.1 billion, again 
dominated by cotton, wheat, and tobacco.  Imports were even greater, however, and an overall 
agricultural products deficit of $650 million was recorded.
17  Data for the most important crops 
are listed in Table 3.   
     Although total cropland did not change drastically from 1909 to 1954, there were a number of 
notable regional and sectoral shifts.  The West North Central states added 19 million acres and 
the Mountain states almost 14 million acres as the last frontiers were filled in, aided considerably 
by improved irrigation techniques.  These states added small grains, such as wheat and barley, as 
they were abandoned by farms in the east.  Corn’s net decrease of 20 million acres was almost 
entirely accounted for by four states:  Missouri, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, the last three of 
which increased land in wheat by 9.5 million acres and sorghum by 13 million acres.  Cotton 
acreage declined in every state in the South, as increasing yields collided with a declining export 
market.  Finally, 15 million acres were taken out of production in the East and Southeast, as 
urbanization and lower output prices changed these farmers’ ability to remain competitive in 
their markets.  
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     By 1954, tractors were used to plow and prepare nearly all of this land; seed, cultivate, and 
fertilize the crops; and harvest all of them, except for cotton and tobacco.  According to the 
census of that year, 2.7 million farms reported a total of 4.3 million tractors.  There were, in 
addition, 980 thousand combines and 688 thousand corn pickers.
18  Only about 500 thousand 
farms had two or more work animals and no tractor; 80 percent of those were in the South.  The 
value of implements and machinery on U.S. farms in 1954 has been estimated at $16.3 billion, 
including about $4.3 billion of automobiles and trucks, or about 13 percent of the value of total 
farm property.
19  With slightly more than $230 million in horses and mules added in, the value of 
‘crop-growing’ capital was $12.2 billion, or about $36.70 per acre harvested.  It is important to 
note that capital intensity, when deflated to 1910 dollars, was $12.77 excluding automobiles and 
trucks, little changed from the $12.52 calculated for the earlier period. 
     The farm labor force of 1954 was significantly smaller than that of 1910.  Not only had the 
numbers of farm proprietors, unpaid family workers, and hired workers all declined significantly, 
but a large proportion of the proprietors also farmed only part-time.  Aided by productivity 
increases from mechanization and the growth of rural manufacturing, almost half of the nation’s 
farm operators held paying jobs away from the farm.  More than 1 million of these operators 
worked more than 200 days per year off-farm.
20  In addition, the hired work force worked far 
fewer days per year, mostly during harvest time, as tractors had replaced the demand for more 
steady labor.
21  With these complications, and lacking an occupational census of the same year, 
the labor force calculation for 1954 was relatively involved.  The details are not included here, 




THE COUNTERFACTUAL PROPOSITION 
     Following the example set by Fogel and repeated in more recent work, the importance of the 
tractor is assessed here by asking the following question:  How much poorer would the United 
States have been in 1954 had the tractor not been invented?  The loss in income calculated from 
this, admittedly, wholly artificial experiment will be construed as the social savings from farm 
mechanization.  Specifically, a hypothetical economy is explored, one forced to grow crops with 
horse and mule power, as was the case in the actual 1910 economy described above. 
     Social savings analyses have often used partial equilibrium models to compare prices of the 
relevant products or services in the actual and counterfactual economies.  Initial assumptions that 
income effects are negligible and consumption price inelastic lead to an estimate that overstates 
the actual savings.  Fogel, who was interested in showing how small the effects of railroads had 
been in the U.S. case, made adjustments directly from this high-side figure.  Authors seeking an 
unbiased estimate, including Coatsworth and Summerhill, have employed a variety of reasonable 
price elasticity figures to reduce the preliminary social savings to a more ‘realistic’ value.   
Model of the Physical Inputs to Farming 
     In this spirit, the model here is based on physical inputs to farm production.  Mechanization 
saved labor directly, both by reducing the number of people involved in farm tasks and by 
speeding up the performance of each task.  By eliminating animal draft power, it also indirectly 
saved the land and labor that would have been required to raise animal feed.  Power farming 
replaced horse and mule capital with that of tractors, combines, and pickers.  Finally, there were 
minor impacts on other inputs:  fuel and lubricants were an added cost, while horseshoes and  
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veterinary care declined.  Seed, irrigation, and fertilizer inputs, so important for increasing 
yields, are not considered within this counterfactual analysis.
23   
     It may be helpful to describe the conceptual experiment in more detail.  Imagine a 
hypothetical external agent buying up all of the internal combustion and diesel-powered farm 
equipment in 1954, paying current asset values for these items.  These machines are then 
removed from the economy, along with the knowledge and technology of their creation and use.  
The farmers are then free to use the proceeds to purchase the inputs necessary to produce farm 
products with the next best available technology, which in this case is the horse and mule-
powered agriculture of the turn of the century.  The ability to produce new crops and use 
chemical and biological knowledge to increase yields is retained by all agents in the system.  
Several further assumptions are made relative to this conceptual process. 
     First, farmers require large numbers of work animals to meet their power needs.  Based on the 
calculations of the previous sections, which showed that real capital intensity did not change 
appreciably with the switch to tractors, it is assumed that all of the proceeds from the 
hypothetical tractor purchase would be required to purchase work stock.
124   
     Second, tractors are assumed to be unavailable elsewhere in the world.  Although the United 
States was a leader in mechanization, by the 1950s most of the developed world had introduced 
tractors.  In this counterfactual, however, changes in trade flows will only be considered to the 
extent that land required for animal feed would displace that actually used for exports.   
     Third, farmers are initially constrained to produce the same amount of crops in the 
counterfactual 1954 as in the historical year, except that no surpluses need be generated.  The 
switch to horses and mules would require a significant increase in acreage for animal feed.  Two 
                                                 
1   
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output mix options are evaluated in the counterfactual analysis:  one in which production of 
major crops is identical to 1954 output, including sorghum and soybeans, which were not 
produced in large amounts early in the century; and one that uses the output mix from 1910, 
scaled up to account for population increase.
25   
     Fourth, additional labor required for farm operations is pulled from the goods producing 
sectors.  Labor demand in these sectors is assumed to be perfectly elastic, with wages equal to 
marginal product; their loss does not affect the productivity of remaining workers.  Under these 
conditions, the social loss from relocating them into agriculture is exactly equal to their wage.   
     Fifth, welfare losses from this experiment would reduce income enough to impact 
consumption.  However, preferences among all goods are not homothetic; food demand is highly 
income inelastic.  In keeping with a number of estimates made by the USDA, this elasticity is 
assumed to be 0.2.
26  Output requirements for the counterfactual are reduced proportionately as 
income falls.   
     Lastly, the 1910 production technology is assumed to use inputs in fixed proportion.  The 
farmer’s decision was essentially to choose an area of land to cultivate.  Given that choice, a 
certain number of operations had to be performed, each requiring a specific amount of labor and 
capital.  Feed for the work animals required an additional amount of land to be cultivated, using 
inputs in the same proportion.  The output yield, which was largely out of the control of the 
farmer, simultaneously determined the absolute return to the three factors.
27 
  More formally, total crop production in the United States can be written as 
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where:  ij is the 1954 yield, in bushels per acre, of crop i in state j; Rij is acreage, Lis labor, and 
Hij the horses used for crop i in state j; i is the labor requirement per acre in state j, assumed the 
same for all crops;
28 and  is the work stock requirement per acre, for all crops and states.  
Production is utilized for consumption (C), animal feed (Y
H), exports (X), and surplus (S): 
S X Y C Y
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with f the quantity of crop f needed to feed one work animal for a year. 
     Because optimization of a fixed-proportion technology requires that the three arguments in 
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Treating land as the limiting factor, equations (1) and (4) can be combined and rearranged to 
give the following: 
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     Equation (5) represents the consumption constraint in the farm sector’s acreage minimization 
problem.  The objective function is simply to minimize the total acreage cultivated, and thus the 
total cost incurred.  Additional constraints include binding upper limits on acreage of each crop 
in each state, determined from the maximum number of acres raised during the period 1900 to 
1954 (denoted by  ij R ), and a limit to the state’s total crop acreage, also determined from 
twentieth-century census data (denoted by  j R ).  
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     The formal statement of the farm sector’s minimization problem is: 
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Requirements for labor and horse capital for each crop and state are determined by 
  ij i ij R L    (6) 
ij ij R H   .   (7) 
     All of the data necessary to solve this constrained optimization are available, including the 
technical parameters i, , f, ij, and the constraints, C, Rij, and Rj.  The next section provides 
details of the data and the acreage-minimizing solutions for both the 1910 and 1954 output crop 
mixes.  An additional iteration is made on the latter option with consumption reduced due to the 
income effect. 
The Counterfactual Data 
     With this framework in place, the experiment is straightforward.  The first step is a 
determination of the effect of horses on the net output of a given acreage.  A number of studies 
by the USDA and other government agencies early in this century provided information on 
optimal feeding of horses and other work animals.  One USDA study widely cited in the 
diffusion literature reported that work horses were fed, on average, 49 bushels of oats, 31 bushels 
of shelled corn, and 4,980 lbs of hay annually, in addition to six months of pasturing.
29   
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Depending on availability of feed, the proportion of corn and oats could be varied, with a bushel 
of corn replacing about 1.8 bushels of oats.  At yields prevailing in 1954, then, maintaining a 
horse for a year would require 1.3 acres of oats, 0.75 acres of corn, and 1.7 acres of hay.  If 
insufficient land existed to grow the required amounts of oats (as is the case here), then an 
alternative scenario would use 0.3 acres of oats, 1.25 acres of corn, and 1.7 acres of hay.
30 
     The 310 million acres of cropland harvested in 1910 used the services of 17.4 million horses 
and 3.8 million mules, or 0.0682 work animals per acre.  This factor intensity would suggest that 
a farm with 44 crop acres would use three work animals, and one growing 60 crop acres would 
have four horses or mules.  These numbers seem quite reasonable in reviewing the literature of 
the period and the more recent tractor diffusion studies. 
     With this information, the net effect of work stock on land requirements can be calculated.  
Cultivation of 100 acres of crops would require 6.82 animals, which, in turn, would eat the 
product of 2.05 acres of oats, 8.5 acres of corn, and 11.6 acres of hay.  Crop failure would claim 
another 4 acres of the total planted, based on 1954 census data.  In total, about 26 of the 100 
acres would be lost or consumed as an intermediate input, leaving the yield from 74 acres for 
consumption.  As labor would have to be supplied to farm all 100 of the acres, the consumption 
of part of the output by the power source has the effect of reducing the productivity of labor. 
     The next step is to apply feed requirements to the 1954 production data, which is reproduced 
here in the first column in Table 5.  Raising crops on the 329 million acres shown would require 
an additional 9.2 million acres of oats, 38.3 million acres of corn, and 52.1 million acres of hay, 
based on the low-oats feeding regime discussed above.
31  The resulting total acreage appears in 
the second column of the table.  Unfortunately, this amount of cropland is well above the 
maximum levels utilized in the historical experience of the United States.  It is possible that this  
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acreage could not even be farmed or would have resulted in substantially higher inputs or lower 
yields than for land areas actually cultivated. 
     To answer this concern, a detailed breakdown of cropland use by state and by crop was 
constructed, using the historical levels from 1909 to 1954 as denoting a feasible region.  Land 
denoted by the 1954 census as ‘cropland harvested’ or ‘cropland used only for pasture’ was 
deemed to be usable for the counterfactual, whereas crop failure and summer fallow areas were 
not considered potentially available.
32  Permanent pasture and woodland areas were also not 
included in the calculation, mostly due to the impossibility of determining their suitability for 
crop agriculture.  The details of this effort are not included here, but the results suggest that just 
less than 400 million acres could be utilized for crops, although the yields on the additional land 
would be slightly lower than the national averages for the major crops considered.  The 432 
million shown as the total for the counterfactual could not be supported within the existing 
farmland use patterns.   
     Fortunately, there were two sources of ‘excess’ production in 1954 for which the value is 
known, and which can be eliminated in calculating social savings.  The early 1950s were times 
of surpluses, as the combination of farm programs, yield improvements, and an export slump 
following the Korean War created an imbalance of supply over demand.  Large stocks of unsold 
farm products accumulated in storage, and the level of stocks of several important crops was still 
increasing in 1954.  Clearly, stock accumulation can be eliminated from the counterfactual 
without any difficulty.  Despite the slump, U.S. exports were still a significant user of cropland, 
especially for wheat and cotton. 
     By eliminating the build up of stocks and releasing the land devoted to exports of corn, wheat, 
and other small grains, a significant decrease in required acreage is achieved.  Not surprisingly,  
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the cotton areas that could be freed up are not nearly as useful.  The small grains do not grow 
well in the warm climates where cotton is grown, and corn yields in Texas and the deep South 
were among the lowest in the country.  As a result, it is unlikely that even extreme land pressures 
as envisioned by this counterfactual would cause abandonment of cotton acreage.  The third 
column of figures in Table 5 shows the net requirements after elimination of surpluses. 
     Finally, the impact of the movement of labor out of manufacturing needs to be considered.  A 
rough calculation of the social savings with this level of agricultural activity suggests that 
hypothetical income in 1954 would have been slightly more than 9 percent lower than it actually 
was.
33  With an income elasticity of food consumption of 0.2, food purchases by consumers 
could be expected to drop by 1.8 percent.  This, in turn, would reduce the land requirements by 
the same amount.  The fourth column of Table 5 shows the results of this adjustment. 
     To this point, all of the calculations regarding land use for each crop in the counterfactual 
have been at the national level.  In an attempt to simulate the local optimization that would have 
occurred and in hopes of avoiding gross distortions that could be caused by this high-level 
analysis, a ‘feasible allocation’ has been constructed using state-level data from the census.
34  In 
essence, the heuristic used adds additional production to each state’s output level based on the 
average yield of the land already in use for that crop.  Constraints are included to prevent 
individual crop acreage from rising above levels supported by historical experience or statewide 
totals from exceeding the sum of available cropland harvested and cropland pastured.  The 
results of this feasible allocation are included as the last column in Table 5. 
     A breakdown by region should provide some additional insights into the adjustments created 
by the counterfactual analysis.  In Table 6, data are presented on actual cropland harvested, the 
feasible allocation discussed above, and the total cropland available for the year 1954, for each  
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census region and for the entire country.  The allocation exceeds total cropland in both Northeast 
regions but falls below the acreage actually farmed in 1909.  In the hypothetical economy, 
therefore, about 2 million acres of Eastern farmland abandoned through the course of this 
century would have remained in production instead.  The other significant change is in the South 
Central states, where about 22 million acres listed in the census as cropland used only for pasture 
would need to be shifted into growing crops. 
     A second scheme for calculating the counterfactual acreage requirements uses the 1909 
output crop mix rather than actual 1954 production.  In this thought experiment, the economy is, 
in effect, frozen in time, growing those crops which were available in the earlier period in the 
same proportions, but with output volumes determined by 1954 yields and population.  As the 
1909 economy was essentially pre-tractor, no separate determination is needed to establish 
animal feed acreage; it is already included in the amounts farmed.  In addition, there is no 
negative income effect on consumption to be considered.  As average incomes were rising 
rapidly through the first half of the century, per capita food consumption should increase, in the 
counterfactual as well as the real world.  Since this undertaking is primarily a check on the 
validity of the first method, however, food requirements are not increased in line with income. 
     Table 7 summarizes the data and results from this second counterfactual.  Actual 1909 
production of the major crops is shown in the first data column.  As this paper stated earlier, 
exports were significant for many crops, especially cotton and wheat.  It is necessary to subtract 
out these exports prior to adjusting for population and yield increases, the results of which appear 
in the second column.  The next two columns record the effect of these population and yield 
adjustments.  The last column presents the results of a state-level allocation of land identical in 
technique to that performed for the first counterfactual.  This analysis concludes that 397 million  
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acres would have been needed to produce the 1909 crop mix with horse and mule-powered 
cultivation, an amount of land that was actually available in 1954. 
     Several interesting observations arise from this second thought experiment.  Most obviously, 
it suggests that it might have been impossible to feed the 1954 population of the country without 
the two agricultural productivity shocks, mechanization and yield improvement.  The total 
acreage shown in the third column of Table 7 is far in excess of that which has ever been 
cultivated in the United States; even if crops could be grown on the wide expanse of pasture land 
in the West, yields would likely have been low and extensive irrigation required.  The rising food 
prices of the last decade of the nineteenth century and first decade of this century would have 
continued unabated, and it is very likely that immigration would have slowed considerably. 
     Secondly, yield improvements in cultivation of corn were far more important than that for any 
other crop in freeing up acreage during this period.  This resulted not only from the use of hybrid 
seed and better understanding of plant biochemistry, but also from a sectoral shift out of the poor 
yielding South and Southeast and into the better soils of the upper Midwest, a shift that would 
have been partially reversed under the counterfactual.  In contrast, the more than doubling of 
cotton yields would have had a relatively minor effect in aggregate.  Although exports were 
removed before adjusting for population and yield changes, and would certainly have re-emerged 
in the counterfactual economy, oversees markets were too competitive to absorb more U.S. 
cotton.  Physical exports of cotton actually fell from 1909 to 1954, from 7.7 million to 3.6 
million bales. 
     Finally, a comparison of Tables 5 and 7 shows very similar results, which boosts confidence 
in the variety of assumptions made in the counterfactuals.  Total crop area requirements differ by 
15 million acres, or less than 4 percent.  The requirements for the three animal feed stocks (hay,  
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corn, and oats) are quite close together.  The greatest differences appear with the two new crops, 
soybeans and sorghum, which were both grown in very small quantities in 1909, and wheat, 
which takes up 23 million less acres in the 1954 crop mix based hypothetical economy.  These 
last results stem from the second specification’s freezing in time of the output proportions from 
the earlier period.  The substitution of soybeans and soybeans for wheat in the two 
counterfactuals is a direct reflection of the substitution that actually occurred in U.S. agriculture. 
Social Savings Calculations   
     Having assembled reasonable cropland numbers for a hypothetical 1954 horse-powered 
agriculture sector, constructing labor savings estimates is the next step.  For simplicity, it is 
assumed that labor is used in fixed proportion to land input, with the factor set equal to its value 
in the base year of 1909.  Earlier in this paper, it was stated that 12.1 million workers were 
required to farm the 310.4 million acres harvested in 1909.  This produces a figure of 0.039 
workers per acre, or about two full-time workers for an average-sized farm with 50 crop acres.  
However, labor intensity in 1909 varied considerably from state to state.  The counterfactual 
economy, by changing the relative amounts of the various crops grown, would also impact labor 
utilization.  To improve the precision of this allocation, hypothetical labor requirements were 
estimated on a state-by-state basis for both of the counterfactuals detailed above.  Producing the 
1954 crop mix with the 1909 technology would be expected to employ 14.4 million workers, and 
the alternate 1909 crop mix economy would use 15.0 million laborers.
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     Earlier in this paper, ecalculations were presented of the effort hours and number of full-time 
equivalent workers for the actual, tractor-using farm sector of 1954.  A total of 11,962 million 
hours were expended in agricultural labor, representing 5.98 million full-time equivalent 
workers.  In addition to forcing the farm operators with substantial off-farm employment and  
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part-time wage workers to return to essentially full-time work, several million additional workers 
would have had to be retained in agriculture, preventing them from moving into the rapidly 
expanding manufacturing sectors of the 1940s and 1950s.  Using the average hourly wage in 
good-producting sectors of $1.65 in 1954, the direct labor savings compared to the 1954 crop 
mix scenario are estimated at $27.8 billion, and $29.8 billion compared to that required by the 
1909 crop mix.
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     Although labor makes up the bulk of the social savings, contributions from exports and stock 
building, the use of grazing land, and a deduction for fuels used by tractors also need to be 
included.  In order to make the acreage allocations feasible, all exports except cotton and 
increases in crop inventories were eliminated.  In effect, these products were eaten up by the 
hypothetical horses.  The inventory increases ‘lost’, if valued at the current price of crops sold, 
were worth $575 million in 1954.  Lost exports for that year had a value of $1.039 billion. 
     Likewise, about 53 million acres of pasture land is converted to growing animal feed under 
the first counterfactual.  Had it not been needed for crops, it would likely have been used for 
feeding cattle, as was the bulk of the nation’s pasture land in the real 1954.  Using the 1954 
census data on cattle production and value, the contribution of this land to grazing can be 
estimated at $3.16 per acre, or about 12.5 percent of the total value of the cattle sustained on it.  
The resulting social savings of $167 million is another part of the total contribution of the 
tractor.
37 
     Finally, tractor operating costs should be deducted from the social savings previously 
calculated, to the extent that they would exceed out-of-pocket expenses for maintaining work 
stock.  As stated previously, capital cost per acre, when adjusted for changes in the price level, 
was approximately the same for tractors as for horses.  Tractors, in addition, required fuel and  
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lubricants to operate, and on occasion repair parts or shop maintenance were needed.  In the case 
of horses, shoes, harnesses, and veterinary care were the major expense items incurred, in 
addition to feed, which has been extensively covered above.  Of all of these factors, the only one 
of significant magnitude is fuel purchase.  Based on a USDA estimate of consumption of various 
fuels by tractors in 1953 and 1955, total fuel expense for 1954 is estimated at $416 million.
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     The social savings results are simmarized in Table 8.  Total savings for the year 1954 are 
$29.2 billion under the most reasonable and thoroughly developed scenario.  With total output in 
that year measured at about $365 billion, the tractor and its related machines are shown to have 
contributed savings worth 8.0 percent of total U.S. GNP.   
 
DISCUSSION 
     The preceding analysis quantified the contribution that agricultural mechanization made to the 
growth of output and welfare in the United States, under a set of reasonable (but somewhat 
restrictive) assumptions.  In this section, we discuss the implications of changes in some of those 
assumptions and we introduce some issues that did not easily fit into the quantitative analysis.  
As the counterfactual was designed to be conservative in its estimates, most of these issues in 
this section would raise the social benefits above the level calculated above. 
     In determining the amount of land required to raise the hypothetical quantities of crops 
required, it was assumed that 1954 levels of yields per acre would be achieved in the absence of 
mechanization.  This assumption is to a great extent warranted by the significant increases in 
scientific knowledge that were obtained in universities, at agricultural experiment stations, and in 
field trials during the first half of this century.  Although advances in corn hybridization have 
been widely celebrated, careful scientific study also improved growth potential, drought and pest  
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resistance, and nutrient uptake for all of the major crops grown in the United States.  In response 
to the creation and wide dissemination of this knowledge, farmers increased their use of hybrid 
seed, chemical fertilizers, and irrigation, and higher yields resulted. 
     Not all of the yield increases were due to scientific knowledge alone, however.  The higher 
speeds in plowing and harvesting facilitated by tractors eliminated time constraints in both spring 
and fall of the year.  Faster planting meant that the farmer could wait to sow until the risk of a 
late frost was minimized.  Quicker harvests allowed the operators to wait until the crop had 
reached peak ripeness, then rapidly bring in the entire crop.  A horse-drawn combine or binder, 
for instance, operated at less than half of the speed of the tractor-drawn or self-propelled models.  
A horse-powered farmer on a large plot who began harvesting when the crop was not quite ripe 
might not finish before the last of the crop dried out and became difficult to cut and thresh.  As a 
result, mechanization contributed to yield improvement by cutting losses due to weather-related 
causes and by increasing the quality of the crop harvested.   
     Although no attempt was made to separate out the impacts of science versus technology on 
yield improvements for all crops, an example with corn should suffice as an illustration.  Johnson 
and Gustafson estimated that mechanization was responsible for one-third of the increase in corn 
yields this century.
39  With this as a basis, the counterfactual can be recalculated, using the same 
process as described in the previous section.  With lower corn yields, an additional 11.5 million 
acres would have to be cultivated to produce the output required by the population and by work 
animals.  This, in turn, would require an increase of 500,000 in the farm labor force, bringing the 
total to 14.9 million full-time workers.  The resulting social savings calculation raises the benefit 
to 8.5 percent of 1954 GNP, versus the 8.0 percent determined above.  Clearly, the contribution 
of tractors to yield improvements of other crops would raise the social savings even further.  
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     A second factor related to yields is more difficult to quantify.  The use of chemical fertilizers, 
herbicides, and pesticides had already become widespread in the years after the second World 
War.  In most parts of the country, these chemicals were applied by tractor.  In addition, the fast 
speed and low out-of-pocket cost of tractor operation meant that farmers conditioned their soil 
more with tractors than they had with horse teams.  An extra disking or pass with a harrow just 
prior to planting made the soil more resilient and encouraged the growth process.  While soil 
conditioning and chemical application could have been done by horse or mule teams, the added 
labor expense and time requirements meant that this was seldom done.  These considerations 
also indicate that the true social savings from mechanization are higher than what has been 
presented. 
     Another unmeasured benefit from the tractor is the improvement of the quality of work life 
for agricultural workers.  Farming at the turn of the century was backbreaking work, for the 
farmer who drove a team of horses; for the laborer who picked cotton, raked hay, and gathered 
forage; and for family workers that fed and cared for the horses.  The physical stress in plowing 
seems incredible for those of us comfortably ensconced in the early twenty-first century:  at the 
end of each row or if the plow became stuck, one or two workers had to lift the plow out of the 
soil, turn the team around, and reposition the plow.   
     With the development of general-purpose tractors, hydraulic implement lifts and weight 
levelers, and the power take-off, farmers entered the era of ‘fingertip farming’.  Although field 
operations were still time-consuming and could be monotonous, the tremendous physical strain 
had been eliminated.  Related mechanical inventions such as the corn picker/sheller, the cotton 
picker, pickup hay baler, and field forage harvester, all dependent on the tractor engine for their 
power, eliminated the more physically demanding of the laborer’s tasks.
40  No attempt has been  
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made to measure these benefits in a way that would allow them to be added to social savings, but 
the benefits to the farmers and farm workers seem clear.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
     In this paper we show that agricultural mechanization as embodied in the tractor and related 
equipment made a significant contribution to the growth of U.S. output.  The social savings is 
calculated at $29.2 billion, or 8.0 percent of U.S. GNP in 1954, an amount several times as large 
relative to the size of the economy than Fogel’s best estimate for railroads in 1890.  Why should 
such an unheralded technology prove to be more important than the mighty railroads, which 
united the country and captured the bulk of the country’s stock investment for half a century? 
     It is likely that the answer lies in two aspects of tractors that differ considerably from the 
railroad experience.  In the first place, waterways and canals were a fairly good substitute for 
railroads in the transportation of commodities at the end of the last century.  The geography of 
the United States is such that most of the population lived close to a navigable waterway; 
railroads were efficient enough to capture much of the shipment volume, but their costs were not 
radically lower than that of water transport.
41  In the case of tractors, however, horses were not a 
very good substitute.  Once the dominant design emerged in the 1930s, tractors were able to 
deliver mobile power with a far lower cost in terms of labor, at a comparable expenditure of 
capital, and without consuming a large portion of the output in the process.  It is interesting to 
note that shipment of goods by water is still common today, whereas horses and mules have 
completely disappeared from commercial agriculture. 
     A second important aspect of the tractor is that it is used to produce food, consumption of 
which is vital to sustaining life.  In any economy producing insufficient food, if imports cannot  
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be increased, resources quickly flow back into agriculture.  The mechanism can be described as 
follows: an inelastic demand for food leading to rising food prices, which induces higher factor 
returns in agriculture, leading to a flow of factors out of manufacturing or services and a 
consequent expansion of agricultural output.
42  The productivity improvements from 
mechanization and yield improvements lead to the opposite result.  Food surpluses brought about 
by the productivity improvements, if exports cannot be increased, cause low returns in 
agriculture, leading to a flow of factors out into manufacturing and services, which allows 
agriculture to contract output to bring it back into balance with demand. 
     In most pre-industrial economies, the food supply imperative causes almost the entire 
economy to be devoted to agriculture.  Any improvement to farm productivity will have a huge 
impact on the wealth of the population, as long as there is alternate employment for the resources 
released from agriculture.  The United States, in its first century as a nation, although well on its 
way to industrialization, had a large proportion of its population engaged in agriculture.  If data 
could be found to analyze the impact of the nineteenth-century inventions of the reaper and 
thresher, a proper social savings calculation should show significant social savings.  In the case 
of the tractor, its adoption allowed the U.S. to reduce farm employment from 33 percent of the 
work force in 1909 to 10 percent in 1954.   
     With this observation, it seems appropriate to return to one of the earlier themes of this paper.  
Economists studying the process of growth earlier in this century believed that releasing 
resources from agriculture was a significant source of wealth improvement; Rostow even 
identified it as one of his preconditions.  Although these economists may have correctly 
described the impact of this process, the analysis above suggests that they failed to identify an 
important cause: it was the technology improvements in agriculture that helped create the  
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opportunity for growth.  The releasing of resources into other sectors was merely the invisible 
hand directing factors to their most profitable use.  Attempting to pull labor out of an inefficient 
agriculture sector inevitably leads to high food prices and import dependency, as many third-
world countries have learned to their sorrow.  Only if the manufacturing and service sectors are 
productive enough to pay the import bill, as is the case with several of the Southeast Asian 
countries, can the agricultural sector be abandoned. 
     This paper concludes with a few words about the process of technological change in general.  
If the endogenous growth theorists are correct and innovations arrive in large numbers at a 
steady rate, then perhaps it does not make sense to study any one particular technology.  The 
focus on human capital accumulation, encouragement of government-sponsored basic research, 
and provision of incentives for spending R&D capital may be all that governments and their 
economic advisors can do.  If, on the other hand, technological innovation is lumpy, with some 
advances clearly more important than others, and especially if entrepreneurs are the primary 
agents of change, then there may be a role for studying the more important inventors and 
inventions of the past.  In his critique of the railroad’s presumed indispensability, Fogel argued 
against “a hero theory of history applied to things rather than to persons.”
43  Although it appears 
he was correct in disputing the railroad’s right to claim superiority in its day, perhaps the tractor 
needs to be considered an unsung hero of the twentieth century.  Certainly, the tractor deserves 
study as one of the nation’s important engines of growth.  
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1909 U.S. Agricultural Output—Major Crops (Acreage, production, and value data in millions) 
Crop Acreage  Production  Value  Yield  per  acre 
Corn, all purposes  98.4  2,552 (bu.)  $1,444   25.9 (bu.)  
Hay and forage  72.3  97.5 (ton)  $824   1.35 (ton)
Cotton  32.0  10.6 (bale)  $703   0.33 (bale)
Wheat  44.3  683 (bu.)  $658   15.4 (bu.)  
Oats  35.2  1,007 (bu.)  $415  28.6 (bu.) 
Potatoes  4.3  448 (bu.)  $202  104 (bu.) 
Tobacco  1.3  1,056 (lbs)  $104  815 (lbs) 
Barley  7.7  173 (bu.)  $92  22.5 (bu.) 
Total field crops  310.4  n. m.   $4,852  n. m. 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1911, pp. 581, 590, 600, 605, 640, 653, 659, 676, 681.    
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Table 2 
The Farm Work Force in 1910 
(All figures in thousands) 
  Farmers  Family laborers  Hired laborers  Total 
U.S. Total  5,995  3,311  2,820  12,126 
Northeast 541  119  353  1,012 
North Central  2,136  634  797  3,566 
South Atlantic  1,040  927  597  2,563 
South Central  1,937  1,569  792  4,299 
West  342  62 282 685 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1911.  Occupation Statistics, p. 91, 96–139.    
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Table 3 
1954 United States Agricultural Output—Major Crops 
(Acreage, production, and value in millions) 
Crop Acreage  Production  Value  Yield  per  acre 
Corn for grain (bushels)  66.8  2,613  $3,758   39.1 
Corn for silage, grazing (tons)  11.3  81.0  $529  7.15 
Hay and Forage (tons)  69.9  103.6  $2,302   1.48 
Cotton (bales)  18.9  12.9   $2,515   0.69 
Wheat (bushels)  51.4  909  $1,940   17.7  
Oats (bushels)  37.9  1,314   $928  34.7  
Potatoes (bushels)  1.5  368   $509  250  
Tobacco (pounds)  1.6  1,922   $974  1,234  
Soybeans for grain (bushels)  16.4  1,386   $816  19.7  
Total field crops  329.2    $16,805   




Estimate of the 1954 Agricultural Work Force 
(All figures in millions) 
  Total People  FTE Workers   Hours per Year 
Farm operators  4.78  3.44  6,880 
Family workers  1.80  1.35  2,694 
Hired workers  3.01  1.19  2,388 
Total 9.59  5.98  11,962 
Source:  USDA, Farm Employment; USDA, The Hired Farm Working Force of 1954; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1955; and authors’ calculations.    
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Table 5 
Actual and Counterfactual Acreage Requirements, Using 1954 Crop Mix 














Corn  78.5  116.8 105.3 103.3 101.9 
Sorghum  17.3  17.3 14.9 14.5 14.7 
Oats  37.9  47.1 44.4 43.6 41.6 
Wheat  51.4  51.4 36.0 35.0 37.7 
Other  grains  19.7  19.7 18.1 17.7 19.9 
Soybeans  17.8  17.8 17.8 17.5 17.6 
Hay  69.9  122.0 116.3 114.3 117.7 
Cotton  18.9  18.9 17.1 16.8 16.8 
Minor  crops  17.8  17.8 14.1 13.8 14.0 
Total  329.2  428.8 384.0 376.5 381.9 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1955; and authors’ calculations, discussed in the text.    
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Table 6 
Actual and Counterfactual Acreage Requirements by Region 










New  England  4.6 2.4 4.5  3.3 
Mid  Atlantic  17.2 11.5 15.2  14.3 
E N Central  59.7  59.2  67.5  70.1 
W  N  Central  114.5 133.5 140.1  146.6 
S  Atlantic  30.2 23.0 26.3  28.9 
E S Central  25.7  19.6  30.6  30.9 
W S Central  39.0  43.5  54.5  57.8 
Mountain  8.8 22.5 24.8  26.7 
Pacific  10.6 14.1 18.3  20.4 
U.S.  Total  310.3 329.3 381.8  399.0 




Actual and Counterfactual Acreage Requirements, Using 1909 Crop Mix 














Corn  98.4  97.0 174.3 115.6 114.2 
Oats  35.2 35.1 63.1 52.1 48.9 
Wheat  44.3 37.5 67.3 58.7 61.0 
Other  grains  13.6 13.3 23.9 19.3 21.1 
Hay  72.3  72.2 129.8 118.2 121.4 
Cotton  32.0 9.0  16.2 7.9  12.2 
Minor  crops  14.7 14.2 23.4 18.9 18.7 
Total  310.5 278.3 497.9 390.6 397.4 




Social Savings from the Farm Tractor in 1954 
(All values in millions of dollars) 
Source  1954 Crop Mix  1909 Crop Mix 
Wage labor freed up  27,800  29,800 
Land reallocated  200  200 
Exports maintained  1,000  1,000 
Crop inventory increased  600  600 
Less:  Fuels used  (400)  (400) 
 Total  savings  29,200  31,200 
  1954 U.S. GNP  364,800  364,800 
  Savings as % of GNP  8.0 %  8.6 % 




























































































Tractors Horses and Mules
 
Source:  Historical Statistics of the United States, Series K184, K570, K572.  
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